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ABSTRACT
This paper employs an overlapping generations model to explore the impact of public abatement on
private investment and the intergenerational distribution of welfare. Whereas public abatement benefits
old generations in terms of non-environmental welfare, future generations gain most in terms of
environmental welfare. The overall benefits tend to be smallest for generations born at the time of the
unanticipated policy shock. Public debt policy, however, can be employed to ensure that welfare gains
are distributed more equally across the various generations. Such a policy implies that natural capital
crowds out man-made capital.
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1. Introduction 
In recent years, serious environmental problems have increased the interest in public policies aimed at
cleaning up the natural environment. However, two objections are often raised against more public
spending for environmental programs. First, more public spending may crowd out private investment,
thereby harming capital accumulation. Second, the intergenerational distributional effects of the
spending programs are likely to be unattractive from a political point of view: the current generations,
who have the voting power, pay for the additional public spending through higher taxes but enjoy only
small environmental benefits because the environment improves only gradually due to stock-flow
dynamics. Indeed, one can view the additional public abatement as an investment in natural capital. The
costs of these public investments are borne by the current generations while the benefits in terms of a
cleaner environment accrue mainly to future generations who are not yet born at the time the investment
must be implemented.
1
This paper explores these two issues within the context of an overlapping-generations model. In
doing so, it investigates not only the macroeconomic effects of environmental policy on saving and
investment but also the implications of environmental policy for efficiency and the intergenerational
distribution. Moreover, we analyze the role of public debt in reducing the intergenerational
distributional effects of public abatement. 
Most of the other literature on environmental policy in an overlapping-generations context (see,
e.g., Howarth (1991), Howarth and Norgaard (1990, 1992), John and Pecchenino (1994), John et al.
(1995), Mourmouras (1993)) employs the model developed by Diamond (1965).  In this model, agents
2
live for two periods only. This makes the model less suited to study transitional dynamics. We employ
the overlapping-generations model popularized by Blanchard (1985) to explore the distributional effects
associated with transitional dynamics. Also Marini and Scaramozzino (1995) adopt this model to
explore environmental policy. Whereas they employ a social welfare function to compute optimal
policies, we focus on Pareto-improving policies as well as policies that are favoured by a majority of
the voting population. In this connection, we explore the role of public debt in ensuring that all
generations benefit. Moreover, in contrast to Marini and Scaramozzino (1995), we investigate the
transitional behaviour of the economy after tightening environmental policy.
Bovenberg and Heijdra (1998) employ a similar model to investigate the impact of a higher
pollution tax. Our present paper differs from Bovenberg and Heijdra (1998) in two major respects.
First, we investigate a different instrument of environmental policy, namely public abatement rather
than a pollution tax on capital. Hence, whereas Bovenberg and Heijdra (1998) relates to the literature
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(2.1)
welfare effects of public spending. The distributional effects of public abatement appear to be rather
different from the corresponding effects of pollution taxes. In particular, older generations gain rather
than lose in terms of non-environmental welfare. A second major difference compared to Bovenberg
and Heijdra (1998) is that we analyze public debt policies that are aimed at making all current
generations equally well off.
Our paper relates to the literature on crowding out of public spending. Judd (1985) investigates
the macroeconomic impacts and welfare effects of public consumption in a closed economy with a
representative, infinitely-lived agent. We extend this analysis to a model with overlapping generations
and public spending that has an investment character (i.e. the benefits accrue only gradually due to
stock-flow dynamics).  Moreover, by including environmental amenities and environmental quality, we
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can explore the interaction between man-made and natural capital and the trade-offs between non-
environmental and environmental welfare. 
To analytically compute the transition to a new steady state, we employ the log-linearisation
techniques introduced by Judd (1982). The analytical solutions explicitly reveal how several major
structural parameters affect the intergenerational welfare effects of environmental abatement. In
particular, it identifies the roles of, among other things, the probability of death (which reflects the
length of the planning horizon), the regeneration capacity of the environment (which determines how
fast the environment converges to a new ecological equilibrium after a reduction in pollution), and the
initial abatement share (which measures how ambitious environmental policy is in the initial
equilibrium).
2. The model 
2.1. Households
The household model builds on the work of Yaari (1965) and Blanchard (1985). A constant
population of agents faces a constant probability of death. The utility functional in period t of a
representative agent of the generation born at time v features the following form:
Here, C(v,-) denotes consumption of private commodities in period - of an agent born at time v, E(-)
represents the quality of the environment in period -, ’￿0 stands for the pure rate of time preference,
￿￿0 is the probability of death (which corresponds to the birth rate so that the population is constant),dA(v,-)
d-
￿ r(-)￿￿ A(v,-) ￿ W(-) ￿ T(-) ￿ C(v,-),
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and ￿  denotes the weight in overall utility attached to environmental amenities. Utility is separable in E
private consumption and the quality of the environment. Accordingly, the quality of the environment
does not directly affect household consumption. The logarithmic specification of utility from private
consumption implies that saving behaviour is guided by a unitary intertemporal elasticity of
substitution. Without leisure entering utility, labour supply is exogenously fixed.
Households face the following budget identity:
where r(-) denotes the real rate of interest on financial assets, W(-) represents the wage rate, T(-) are
net lump-sum taxes,  and A(v,-) stands for real financial assets owned in period - by a household born
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at time v. The return on financial assets exceeds the rate of interest because, in the absence of bequest
motives, agents conclude actuarially fair annuity contracts with life insurance companies. In particular,
agents receive an annuity payment from the insurance company proportional to their financial wealth
(￿A(v,-)) in exchange for transferring their entire estate to the insurance company upon death. Since the
contracts are actuarially fair, the annuity rate equals the death rate ￿. 
The representative agent chooses a time profile for C(v,-) by maximising (2.1) subject to (2.2)
and a transversality condition. The solution for consumption in period t amounts to:
where (age-independent) expected life-time human wealth, H(t), is given by: 
After-tax wages are defined as the return to human capital, i.e., W (t)￿W(t)-T(t). 
N
The simple demographic structure of the model allows one to analytically aggregate
generations. During each unit of time, a cohort of size ￿L is born while ￿L agents pass away. The
resulting constant population size L is normalised to unity. Given this simple demographic structure,
aggregate financial wealth, A(t), is defined by A(t)￿￿, A(v,t)e dv. The aggregate values for C(t), -￿
t ￿(v-t)
T(t), and H(t) are obtained in the same fashion. This yields the following equations describing the
behaviour of the aggregate household sector:C(t) ￿ (’￿￿)[A(t)￿H(t)],























Equation (2.3) is the aggregate version of the household budget identity (2.2). The annuity payments,
￿A(v,-), at the right-hand side of (2.2) are a transfer from those who die to those who remain alive and
therefore do not enter the economy-wide budget identity (2.3).
2.2. Firms
The production sector of the economy is perfectly competitive. The production function is
Cobb-Douglas with constant returns to scale to the factors capital, K(t), and labour, L(t):
where Y(t) denotes net  production, ￿ >0, and 0<￿ <1. Firms maximise the value of the firm, V(t),
5
0 L
which is defined as follows:
subject to the production function and the following dynamic constraint for capital accumulation:
where ￿  stands for the depreciation rate of capital, and K ￿(-)￿dK(-)/d- denotes the rate of change in K
the capital stock.  The first-order conditions for labour and capital demand imply that the marginal
6
productivity of labour and capital equals the producer costs of these production factors:
We abstract from adjustment costs in investment. Accordingly, the value of equity corresponds to the
replacement value of the capital stock, i.e. V(t)=K(t).  
7￿ B(-) ￿ r(-)B(-) ￿ G(-) ￿ T(-),
lim
-￿￿



















The intergenerational welfare implications of tax policy depend on the way the government
balances its budget. The periodic budget identity can be written as follows:
where  B(-) and G(-) stand for, respectively, outstanding government debt and public abatement
spending at time -. The government can finance its spending by either issuing more debt
(B ￿(-)￿dB(-)/d->0) or by levying lump-sum taxes (T(-)). The following No Ponzi Game condition
ensures that the government remains solvent:
The government's intertemporal budget constraint is derived by integrating (2.8) and using the solvency
condition (2.9):
2.4. Ecology
The environment is modelled as a renewable resource. Its quality depends negatively on the
amount of pollution that is generated in the production process. Denoting the stock of pollution at time
- by P(-), we write the general form of the emission equation as P ￿(-)=H(P(-),K(-),G(-)). Nature
features a regenerative capacity so that 0H/0P<0. By raising production, a larger capital stock yields
additional emissions, i.e., 0H/0K>0. Finally, public abatement activities reduce emissions, so that
0H/0G<0.
Environmental quality depends on the stock of pollution in deviation from some constant
(virgin) value P ￿, i.e. E(-)￿P ￿-P(-). Hence, the evolution of the environmental quality is determined by:
This ecological relationship has been loglinearized as in (T.41) in Table 2. The parameter ￿  represents E
the adjustment speed of the environment (￿ ￿-f >0). A high value for ￿  implies that nature regenerates EE E
quickly. ￿  (￿fK / fE >0) and ￿  (￿-fY / fE >0) measure the steady-state elasticities of environmental KK E G G E
quality with respect to, respectively, physical capital and abatement spending.
8￿ C(t)
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2.5. Summary of the model
Table 1 presents the complete model. Equations (T.1)-(T.4) represent the dynamic part of the
model. Aggregate consumption evolves according the aggregate Euler equation (T.1),  which can be
9
written as:
The first term at the right-hand sides of these equations denotes individual consumption growth, while
the second term indicates how the replacement of older (and thus richer) by younger (and thus poorer)
generations reduces aggregate consumption growth. The development of stocks of aggregate physical
capital, government debt, and environmental quality are described by, respectively, (T.2), (T.3), and
(T.4). The static part of the model is represented by equations (T.5)-(T.7). (T.5) models the aggregate
net production function, and the marginal productivity conditions are given by (T.6) and (T.7).
Only four fundamental parameters fully characterise the model. This minimal set consists of
the probability of death, ￿￿0, the rate of time preference, ’>0, the initial steady-state share of
government spending on abatement in income, 7 , and the net income share of labour, ￿ . Once these GL
parameters are known, the steady-state capital-output ratio (K/Y), the interest rate (r), and the share of
human wealth in total wealth (7 ￿H/(H+K)) are uniquely determined. It is often useful, for ease of H
interpretation, to write r=’+￿(1-7 ), so that we can express the model in terms of ￿, ’, 7 , and r H G
instead. This also shows more clearly that in the special case of infinite horizons (i.e. ￿=0) the steady-
state interest rate is fixed by the discount rate.
PROPOSITION 2.1: Assume 7 <￿ . A stable long-run equilibrium exists to (T1)-(T7). This equilibrium GL
is dynamically efficient. The equilibrium interest rate satisfies ’<r<’+￿, and depends on the
fundamental parameters according to: dr/d￿>0, 0<dr/d’<1, dr/d7 >0, and dr/d￿ <0. GL
P ROOF: See Bovenberg and Heijdra (1998).
To analyze the model, we log-linearise the various equations around the initial steady state.
Table 2 contains the log-linearised model.  A variable with a tilde (“~”) is generally defined as the per-
10˜ G(t) ￿ dG(t)
Y
, ˜ T(t) ￿ dT(t)
Y
, ˜ B(t) ￿ rdB(t)
Y
.
˜ G(t) ￿ A(!G,t) ˜ G,
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(3.1)
unit deviation from the initial steady-state, e.g., X ˜(t)￿dX(t)/X. For a number of variables, we adopt the
following alternative notational conventions:
The combination of a tilde and a dot represent the time rate of change in terms of the initial level.
Proposition 2.2 summarises some results that will prove useful in the rest of the paper. 
PROPOSITION  2.2:  The log-linearized model features characteristic roots r >0 and -h <0. The
**
unstable root satisfies r >￿+r and the stable root satisfies -h <r-(’+￿).
**
P ROOF: See Bovenberg and Heijdra (1998).
Figure 1 draws the phase diagram associated with the model. With infinite horizons (i.e. ￿=0),
the C ￿=0 and K ￿=0 lines intersect in point A. The steady-state capital stock is given by K , which is the
KR
Keynes-Ramsey capital stock for which the real rate of interest equals the pure rate of time preference
(i.e., r=0F/0K=’). If lives are finite (￿>0), the C ￿=0 line is upward sloping with a vertical asymptote at
K=K . 
KR
The C ￿=0 and K ￿=0 lines yield a unique, saddle-point stable equilibrium (point E ), which 0
defines the Blanchard-Yaari level of the capital stock, K . If G is increased, the K ￿=0 line shifts down
BY
horizontally (see the dashed line in Figure 1). As a result, the equilibrium point E  shifts down and to 0
the left. 
3. Raising public abatement
This section explores the effects of raising public abatement. The higher level of abatement is phased in
either gradually or in an abrupt fashion. We abstract from public debt policy. In particular, the public
budget is balanced at each point in time by adjusting lump-sum taxes. We normalise time so that the
unanticipated policy shock occurs at time t=0.  The shock takes the following shape:
11˜ C(0) ￿
￿!G r ￿￿(r￿’) ˜ G
r ￿(r ￿￿!G)7C
<0 .












where  ! >0 and A(! ,t)￿1-e  is a single adjustment term with A(! ,0)=1-lim A(! ,t)=0. GG GG
- ! t G
t ￿￿
Furthermore, dA(! ,t)/dt￿0 (See Lemma A.1 in Bovenberg and Heijdra (1998)). If ! ￿￿, the shock is G G
introduced instantaneously; announcement and implementation coincide so that anticipation effects are
absent. If !  is finite, implementation occurs only gradually after announcement, which gives rise to G
anticipation effects.
3.1. The macroeconomy
The increase in public abatement is financed through higher lump-sum taxes. The higher taxes
cause the value of human capital to decline. As a result of the negative wealth effect, consumption falls
at impact:
The impact effect on private investment is ambiguous:
If the policy is introduced abruptly (! ￿￿, and G ˜(0)=G ˜), private investment declines unless the birth G
rate is zero (i.e. ￿=0 so that r=’). With a fixed capital stock and hence fixed output supply in the short
run, the rise in public abatement demand crowds out private investment because the short-run drop in
private consumption is not sufficiently large to offset the increase in public abatement. The relatively
small drop in private consumption originates in intergenerational distribution in favour of current
generations (see below). These intergenerational distributional effects are absent if the birth rate is zero.
In that case, therefore, private consumption declines sufficiently to offset the rise in public abatement
so that private investment remains constant.
If the shock is not yet implemented at t=0 and thus only anticipated at that time (i.e., G ˜(0)=0
since ! <￿), capital accumulation rises rather than falls initially (since r >r+￿>r-’). Intuitively, house- G
*
holds adjust their consumption downward in anticipation of the future lump-sum taxes that will be
required to finance the additional future public spending. In the short run, this leaves more room for
private investment as the increase in public spending takes effect only in the future. Intuitively, short-
term investment rises because, in contrast to the government, consumers practice consumption
smoothing (see also Judd (1985)).
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crowd out private investment. Eventually, the capital stock falls to a lower level than before the shock.
In particular, the stock of capital follows the following time path:
where T(￿ ,￿ ,t) denotes a so-called single transition term: 12
and K ˜(￿) stands for the long-run effect on the capital stock:
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The first term on the right-hand side of (3.4) represents the transition path associated with a permanent
unanticipated shock. The term involving the single transition term T(h ,! ,t) describes the modifications
*
G
to the transition path due to the gradual introduction of the shock (0<! «￿). The single transition term G
is bell-shaped, zero at impact and in the long run, and positive during the transition (see Lemma A.2 in
Bovenberg and Heijdra (1998)). It vanishes if the shock is applied abruptly (i.e. ! ￿￿). A low value of G
! , in contrast, implies that the shock is applied only slowly. The associated anticipation effects give G
rise to a fall in private consumption in advance of the rise in public abatement. The associated
crowding in of investment produces a temporary rise in the stock of private capital, which is reflected in
the last term at the right-hand side of (3.4).
Equation (3.5) shows that the long-run effect of additional abatement on the capital stock is
negative, unless agents are infinitely lived, in which case ￿=0 and r=’. Also, long-run consumption
declines as a result of the additional abatement (even if agents are infinitely lived):
In case of a zero birth rate, private consumption makes sufficient room for the additional public
spending so that capital accumulation is not affected (compare Judd (1985)). If the birth rate is
positive, however, private consumption does not decline sufficiently to prevent private investment from






accumulation. The production capacity therefore declines gradually over time. Accordingly, in the long
run, consumption is crowded out by more than one hundred percent.
The intertemporal reallocation of aggregate consumption away from the future towards the
present originates in intergenerational redistribution. The higher lump-sum taxes amount to taxes on
human capital. These taxes impose a heavier burden on younger generations than on older generations
because the younger generations rely more heavily on human capital and less on financial capital to
finance their consumption. More specifically, at any time t>0, the younger generations who were born
after the policy shock (at t=0) rely more on human capital than the older generations who were already
alive at t=0. These future, younger generations thus bear most of the burden of financing the additional
public spending. The intergenerational redistribution in favour of current generations bolsters aggregate
consumption in the short run, thereby harming investment. The transition path for consumption is given
by:
The phase diagram for consumption and the capital stock, which is contained in Figure 2,
illustrates the transition towards a new steady state. The IS curve represents all points for which the
goods market is in equilibrium with a constant capital stock. The MKR curve stands for the modified
Keynes-Ramsey rule, i.e., the steady-state aggregate Euler equation modified for the presence of
overlapping generations. In terms of Figure 2, the increase in government spending shifts the IS curve
down from IS  to IS . This causes the long-run equilibrium to shift from E  to E . Hence, both long-run 01 01
consumption and the long-run capital stock drop. The arrows denote the dynamic forces associated with
the old equilibrium E , while SP represents the saddle path associated with the new equilibrium E .  0 1
  If the policy is introduced instantaneously (! ￿￿), the economy jumps at time t =0 from E  to G0 0
A (described by equation (3.2)) onto the saddle path, after which gradual adjustment follows towards
E . The first term in equation (3.4) and the first two terms in (3.6) describe this path. If the policy is 1
introduced gradually (!  finite), anticipation effects are relevant. Heuristically, the adjustment path G
becomes more like that associated with a pure anticipated abrupt shock,  i.e., first, at announcement
13
time t =0, the jump from E  to B ; second, between announcement and implementation time, gradual 0 0
movement from B to C on the new saddle path according to the dynamic forces associated with the old
equilibrium; and finally, after implementation, gradual movement along the saddle path associated with
the new equilibrium from C to E . The more gradually the policy is introduced (i.e., the lower is ! ), the 1 G
more the actual adjustment path represents the path associated with an anticipated abrupt policy chock.
Also the size of the jump from E  to B is directly regulated by the value of !  (see also equation (3.2)). 0 G˜ C
.
(0) ￿￿ ( r ￿ ’ )r ￿ ￿ ( r ￿ ’ )
r ￿7 C
! G
r ￿ ￿ ! G
˜ G<0 .
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Figure 2 thus confirms that, in the case of an anticipated policy shock, the adjustment of the
capital stock is non-monotonic as the dynamic forces of the old equilibrium dominate immediately after
the instantaneous fall in consumption due to the anticipation of a higher tax level. The dynamic forces
in Figure 2 show also that the adjustment path for consumption must be monotonic. A simple
application of the initial value theorem confirms this for the initial development of consumption:
The intergenerational redistribution in favour of current, older generations and at the expense of future,
younger generations causes consumption to fall over time. Only if a zero birth rate (which implies that
r=’) excludes intergenerational redistribution, does not consumption decline further after an initial
drop. In that latter case, consumption smoothing by a representative, infinitely lived household implies
that aggregate consumption remains constant. 
Proposition 3.1 shows that the (non-) monotonicity results extend to the entire adjustment paths
for capital and consumption.
PROPOSITION  3.1:  The solution paths for consumption and the capital stock (represented by,
respectively,  (3.4) and (3.6)) satisfy the following properties:
 (i)  The adjustment path of the capital stock cannot be monotonous unless the unanticipated
policy is introduced abruptly (! ￿￿).  G
(ii)  After an initial drop at the time of the policy shock, aggregate consumption declines further
in a monotonic fashion unless the birth rate is zero. In the latter case, consumption remains
constant after the initial drop.
PROOF: See Bovenberg and Heijdra (1998).
3.2. Factor prices
This sub-section studies the adjustment path of earnings on physical capital (i.e. the rate of
interest) and human capital (i.e., after-tax wages defined as the difference between gross wages and
lump-sum taxes). Using r ˜(t)￿-￿ K ˜(t) and the solution for the capital stock (3.4), we arrive at the L
following time path of the interest rate:˜ r(t) ￿￿ ￿ LA(h ￿,t) ˜ K(￿) ￿
r￿L r￿’￿!G
(1￿￿L)(r￿￿!G)




˜ G ￿ 0.
˜ W
N(t) ￿ ￿L(1￿￿L) ˜ K(t) ￿ ˜ G(t),
˜ W
N(￿) ￿￿
￿ L￿ 7 G￿ (1￿￿L)￿L (r￿’)￿r￿L7C
r￿L7C￿(￿L￿7G)(r￿’)




When the abatement policy is announced at time t=0, the capital stock and hence the rate of return on
physical capital are fixed. Consequently, the entire burden of the lump-sum tax is borne by labour (see
below). If the policy is adopted gradually, the capital stock rises at first so that the interest rate falls
initially. As time elapses, however, the decumulation of the capital stock causes the rate of return to
rise to a higher level than before the shock. By substitution the steady-state capital stock (3.5) into
(3.7), we obtain the long-run effect on the interest rate:
In the presence of overlapping generations (which implies r>’), the long-run rate of return on physical
capital exceeds its initial steady-state equilibrium value. Thus, capital owners are actually better off in
the long run as a result of the higher lump-sum taxes. With infinitely-lived agents (i.e. ￿=0 and r=’, see
Judd, 1985), however, the long-run interest rate is fixed by the exogenously given rate of time
preference,  ’.
After-tax wages (net of lump-sum taxes, i.e. W (t)￿W(t)-T(t)) mirror the behaviour of the
N
interest rate. By employing W ˜ (t)=(1-￿ )K ˜(t) and T ˜(t)=G ˜(t), we find for the after-tax wage rate: L
where  W ˜ (t)￿dW (t)/Y=￿ W ˜ (t)-G ˜(t). The first term at the right-hand side of (3.8) represents the
NN
L
positive effect of the capital stock on the marginal product of labour and hence the before-tax wage
rate, while the second term on the right-hand side stands for the detrimental effect of higher lump-sum
taxes on the net wage. On impact, higher lump-sum taxes reduce after-tax wages, unless the policy is
introduced gradually (i.e. G ˜(0)=0) in which case W ˜ (0)=0. Although wages may rise initially if the
N
policy is introduced gradually, the eventual erosion of the capital stock puts wages on a downward
path. By using (3.8) and (3.5), we can derive that:
Even in the absence of overlapping generations, long-run wages decline as a result of the lump-sum
taxes needed to finance the additional public abatement.˜ E(￿) ￿ ￿G ˜ G ￿
￿K(r￿’)
r￿L7C￿(￿L￿7G)(r￿’)
˜ G >0 .
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The long-run quality of the environment improves for two distinct reasons, which are
represented by the two terms at the right-hand side of expression (3.9):
The first term at the right-hand side of (3.9) reveals that more public abatement directly improves the
environment. The second term represents the positive environmental effects associated with a lower
polluting capital stock. In particular, in the presence of overlapping generations (i.e. r>’ because ￿>0),
the long-run capital stock declines due to intergenerational redistribution away from future towards
current generations. 
By substituting the time paths for abatement and the capital stock (represented by, respectively,
(3.1) and (3.4)) into the environmental equation (T.41) in Table 2, and solving the resulting differential
equation subject to the initial condition E ˜(0)=0, we obtain the following time path for the quality of the
environment:
where A(￿ ,￿ ,t) represents a multiple adjustment term: Ei











Lemmas A.3 and A.4 of Bovenberg and Heijdra (1998) show that the multiple adjustment terms are
non-negative, S-shaped, and increasing functions of time, and that the multiple transition term is a non-
negative, single-peaked, bell-shaped function of time.  The multiple adjustment terms exhibit an
14
adjustment path that is determined by a weighted average of two adjustment speeds, with the largest
weight being attached to the slowest moving component. For example, if the ecological system adjusts
more slowly than the capital stock (i.e. ￿ <h ), the ecological adjustment speed ￿  carries the largest EE
*
(i.e., positive) weight in the adjustment term A(￿ ,h ,t). Indeed, the environment improves slowly for E
*
three reasons: First, the policy is introduced slowly (if ! «￿). Second, the capital stock decumulates G
only gradually. Third, the stock-flow dynamics of the environment slow down the adjustment.
The first term at the right-hand side of (3.10) represents the direct beneficial effect of more
public abatement on the quality of the environment. Here the adjustment speed depends on both the
speed at which the policy is phased in (represented by ! ) and the speed at which the environment G
regenerates (￿ ). E
The second term at the right-hand side of (3.10) represents the positive environmental effect
due to a reduction in the polluting capital stock. In the presence of overlapping generations, the long-
run capital stock falls. If the birth rate is zero, however, the long-run capital stock remains constant
(see equation (3.5) with r=’), and the second term at the right-hand side of (3.10) drops out. The
adjustment term indicates that the resulting environmental adjustment occurs only slowly as both the
capital stock adjusts only gradually and the environment regenerates slowly.
The third term at the right-hand side of (3.10) shows that gradual (rather than abrupt)
introduction of the abatement policy yields temporary adverse effects on the environment. Intuitively,
economic agents accumulate more capital in the short run in anticipation of higher taxes (see (3.3)).
The associated temporarily larger capital stock causes additional pollution in the short run.
The first two terms at the right-hand side of (3.10) give rise to a steady improvement in
environmental quality, but the third term works in the direction of a temporary deterioration. Hence,
although environmental quality improves in the long run, it may well decline in the short run as a result
of a temporary boost to capital accumulation. In particular, environmental quality worsens initially if:
The initial worsening of the environment requires that abatement is increased only very gradually (i.e.,
!  small) while horizons are long (i.e., r-’=￿(1-7 ) is small). In that case, forward-looking households GH
reduce their short-run consumption substantially in anticipation of the higher lump-sum taxes




˜ G >0 ,
d U (0) ￿ dUNE(0) ￿ ￿EdUE(0).
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(3.11)
relatively strong effect on environmental quality (i.e., ￿ /￿ (1-￿ ) is large) for the quality of the KG L
environment to fall in the short run. If the policy is phased in instantaneously (! ￿￿), anticipation G
effects are absent. Accordingly, the third term on the right-hand side of (3.10) vanishes, and adjustment
of the environmental quality is monotonous. Proposition 3.2 summarizes these effects.
PROPOSITION 3.2: The solution path for environmental quality (represented by (3.10)) satisfies the
following properties: 
(i)  If the policy is introduced slowly and the birth rate is low, the environmental quality may
deteriorate at first before improving later.
(ii)  If the policy is introduced abruptly, environmental quality increases monotonically.
PROOF: See Bovenberg and Heijdra (1998).
3.4. No overlapping generations: The efficiency case for public abatement
The welfare effects of public abatement can be analyzed by employing the methods developed
for the infinite horizon model by Judd (1982, 1985, 1987) and extended to overlapping generations by
Bovenberg (1993, 1994). In the presence of environmental amenities, welfare effects can be
decomposed into two components. The first component represents the change in non-environmental
welfare and is denoted by dU (0). The second component measures the change in environmental NE
welfare and is denoted by dU (0). E
In the absence of overlapping generations and with an abrupt shock (! ￿￿), non-environmental G
welfare of the representative agent is given by:
Non-environmental welfare declines on account of the higher lump-sum taxes required to finance the
additional abatement. The environmental benefits of public abatement yield the following increase in
environmental utility:
Overall welfare is given by the weighted sum of private and environmental welfare:




















environmental weight, ￿ ˆ , for which the abatement share would be optimal, i.e. ￿ ˆ ￿-dU (0)/dU (0). E EN E E
Alternatively, for each value of ￿ , we can find the abatement share for which the overall marginal E
welfare effect is zero. This is in fact the optimal share of public abatement 7 ˆ: G
Equation (3.12) implies the following effects for the optimal abatement share: 07 ˆ/ 0 ￿ >0, 07 ˆ/ 0 ￿=0, GE GK
0 7 ˆ/ 0 ￿>0, and 07 ˆ/ 0 ￿ >0 (see Bovenberg and Heijdra (1998)). A strong concern for the environment GG GE
implies a high optimal abatement share. The same holds true for a high elasticity of the steady-state
environment with respect to abatement. Moreover, the higher is the speed of regeneration of the
environment, the more substantial are the environmental benefits from additional abatement, and hence
the higher is the optimal abatement share. 
3.5. Intergenerational welfare
In the presence of overlapping generations, the tax burden associated with additional public
abatement affects the various generations in different ways. This sub-section explores the
intergenerational distribution effects.
3.5.1. Non-environmental welfare
 For  existing generations, the change in non-environmental welfare amounts to a weighted
average of the jump in consumption that occurs at time t=0 (i.e., C ˜(0)) and the Laplace transform of
changes in the interest rate:
The first term at the right-hand side of (3.13) represents the impact of higher lump-sum taxes on the
initial consumption level while the second term stands for the effect of changes in the interest rate on
the growth rate of consumption. The second term can be written as:
The sign of the Laplace transform of changes in the interest rate is ambiguous and depends (among
other things) on the probability of death and the speed at which the policy is introduced. If agents
exhibit infinite lives (￿=0 and r=’), the effect of interest changes on non-environmental welfare is
unambiguously negative if the policy is introduced gradually (!  finite). This is due to anticipation GdUNE(t,t) ￿ dUNE(0,0) ￿ dUNE(￿,￿)￿dUNE(0,0) A(h ￿,t) ￿ 6
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effects, which cause a temporary increase in the capital stock and hence a temporary drop in the rate of
interest. If the policy is introduced instantaneously (i.e. ! ￿￿) and overlapping generations are absent G
(￿=0 and r=’), the capital stock, and hence the interest rate, remain constant.
Matters are slightly more involved if agents feature finite lives. In that case, the sign of the
Laplace transform of interest rate changes in (3.14) depends on both the probability of death (￿) and
the speed with which the policy is introduced. If the policy is introduced instantaneously (! ￿￿), the G
capital stock declines monotonically. Consequently, the Laplace transform of changes in the interest
rate is unambiguously positive. For very old agents (with a very negative index v), the positive second
term at the right-hand side of (3.13) dominates the negative first term. Hence, these agents
unambiguously enjoy higher non-environmental welfare, despite the higher tax level required to finance
the abrupt increase in public abatement. The reason is that the very old are wealthy because they have
had a long time to accumulate large stocks of financial wealth. Consequently, the elderly do not suffer
much from the higher lump-sum taxes but benefit substantially from the rise in the interest rate.
Young agents who have been born just before the policy shock occurred (i.e. with an index v
close to zero), in contrast, suffer substantially from the higher lump-sum taxes. These generations hold
little or no financial wealth and thus depend almost entirely on human wealth, the value of which
declines on account of the higher lump-sum taxes. Hence, whereas the change in non-environmental
utility experienced by existing generations is positive for the oldest generations, this non-environmental
welfare effect becomes negative for younger households. 
If lives are finite and the policy is introduced gradually, non-environmental utility of agents
born at the time of the shock unambiguously declines. However, for very old agents, this welfare effect
is ambiguous. The oldest generations face a loss in non-environmental welfare if both r-’=￿(1-7 ) and H
!  are small, i.e., if lives are long and the policy is introduced only slowly. In that case, the anticipation G
effects are substantial (because !  is small) while the intergenerational distributional effects are only G
small (because r-’=￿(1-7 ) is small). Accordingly, the short-run decline in the interest rate on account H
of the anticipation effects dominates the long-run increase in the interest rate on account of
intergenerational distribution effects. 
For generations who have not yet been borne at the time of the policy shock (i.e. so-called
future generations whose generation index coincides with the historical time index, t>0), the time path
for the change in non-environmental utility can be written as:
where 6 (! ) is a function of parameters and ! , and where the non-environmental welfare effect for NE G G
the generation born at the time of the policy shock, dU (0,0), is given by expression (3.13) with v=0. NE(’￿￿)dUNE(￿,￿) ￿






For generations born in the new steady state, non-environmental welfare is given by:
Generations born far into the future enjoy less non-environmental utility than future generations born
earlier do because they have less physical capital to work with. Indeed, equation (3.8) shows that the
decline in the capital stock causes after-tax wages to gradually fall over time. Hence, generations born
in the new steady state are worse off in terms of non-environmental welfare than in the initial steady
state. Proposition 3.3 summarizes the main features of non-environmental utility for various
generations.
PROPOSITION  3.3:  The solution paths for non-environmental utility of the various cohorts satisfy the
following properties:
(i)  The oldest generations gain unless the policy is introduced sufficiently slowly and the birth
rate is sufficiently low. Furthermore, 0dU (v,0)/0v<0. NE
(ii)  The generation born at the time of the shock loses regardless of the value of ! . The loss is G
increasing in !  (i.e., dU (0,0)<0 and 0dU (0,0)/0! <0). GN E N E G
(iii)  The generations born in the new steady state loses regardless of the value of !  (i.e., G
dU (￿,￿)<0). NE
(iv)  The generations born in the new steady state are worse off than the generations born at the
time of the policy shock regardless of !  (i.e. dU (￿,￿)< dU (0,0)<0). GN E N E
(v)  In the absence of overlapping generations (i.e. ￿=0), the representative households suffers a
welfare loss regardless of the value of ! . G
PROOF: See Bovenberg and Heijdra (1998).
3.5.2. Environmental welfare
All existing generations face the same probability of death and thus expect the same remaining
life time. Accordingly, they experience the same boost in environmental utility on account of improved

























The first term in square brackets at the right-hand side of (3.15) represents the direct positive impact on
the environment of additional public abatement. The other terms represent the effect of changes in the
capital stock on the environment. If the policy is introduced gradually, the capital stock rises at first
before it falls to its lower long-run value. If the policy is introduced sufficiently slowly, the initial boost
to capital accumulation, which pollutes the environment, dominates the long-run drop in polluting
capital stock. Hence, the term in round brackets is negative if the speed with which the policy is
introduced, ! , is small. Rather paradoxically, existing generations may actually end up with lower G
environmental welfare if the policy is introduced slowly (!  small), horizons are short (the death rate ￿ G
is large), and abatement is not very effective (￿ /￿  small). During their lifetimes, these generations GK
experience a long transition period during which the environment worsens due to the temporary boost in
investment.
Environmental utility unambiguously rises in the long run, both because the capital stock falls
(see (3.5)) and because of the direct positive environmental effects of more public abatement:
The comparison of (3.15) and (3.16) reveals that future generations enjoy a higher level of
environmental utility than existing generations do (i.e., dU (￿)>dU (0)). Moreover, the adjustment path EE
of environmental utility need not be monotonous if the policy is introduced gradually.
The main characteristics of the time path of environmental utility are summarized in
Proposition 3.4. 
PROPOSITION 3.4: The solution path for environmental utility satisfies the following properties:
(i)  Existing generations gain unless the policy is introduced very slowly (!  low), the birth rate G
is high, and abatement is not very effective (￿ /￿  large). KGdU(v,0) ￿ dUNE(v,0) ￿ ￿EdUE(0), v￿0,











(ii)  The generations born in the new steady-state gain regardless of the value of !  (i.e., G
dU (￿)>0). E
(iii)  Future generations gain more than present generations do (i.e. dU (￿)>dU (0)). EE
(iv)  If the policy is introduced instantaneously (! ￿￿), non-environmental welfare rises G
monotonically.
PROOF: See Bovenberg and Heijdra (1998).
3.5.3. Total welfare: Pareto improving reforms
Overall welfare amounts to a weighted sum of non-environmental and environmental welfare:
If the policy is introduced abruptly (! ￿￿), the older generations reap the largest benefits of the G
generations that are alive at t=0. While all currently living generations enjoy the same environmental
improvements, the elderly suffer less from the increase in lump-sum taxes because human wealth is a
relatively small wealth component for the elderly. Among the generations that are yet to be born at t=0,
the oldest generations (i.e. the generations that are born immediately after t=0) benefit the most only if
the weight of environmental welfare, ￿ , is very small. The reason is that the older generations have a E
larger capital stock to work with than the younger generations and thus enjoy higher wages and non-
environmental welfare. However, the younger cohorts of the generations that are born after t=0
experience a larger improvement in environmental welfare and thus, if the weight of environmental
welfare ￿  is large, experience a larger gain in overall welfare than the older generations born earlier E
after t=0.
An abrupt increase in public abatement is Pareto welfare-improving if the overall welfare of all
future generations increases. The minimum level of the environmental utility weight for which the
reform is Pareto-welfare improving is given by:
The numerical simulations in sub-section 3.6 below indicate that for reasonable parameter values the
generation born at t=0 is the critical generation, i.e. the generation for which the environmental weight







The oldest of the future generations is the critical generation because the gain in environmental welfare
rises faster with the date of birth of a generation than the absolute value of the loss in non-
environmental welfare does. Indeed, the literature on overlapping-generations models with exogenous
labour supply suggest that, for reasonable values for the birth rate, the crowding-out effects of higher
public spending on private saving and investment are quite small (see, for example, Auerbach and
Kotlikoff (1987, pp. 97-101) and Romer (1988)). Hence, in view of only limited capital decumulation,
wages, and thus non-environmental welfare, do not decline much over time.
Another reason for why the oldest future generations are the critical generations is the
following. The non-environmental losses on account of capital decumulation are accompanied by
environmental gains due to a smaller polluting capital stock. Hence, crowding-out of private investment
implies that the younger future generations not only bear larger non-environmental costs but also enjoy
larger environmental benefits than older future generations do. Moreover, the environmental benefits on
account of crowding out of private investment are supplemented by the direct environmental gains due
to more public abatement. These latter environmental gains accrue mainly to younger, future
generations because these gains occur only gradually through time because of stock-flow dynamics.
Hence, the additional environmental gains enjoyed by future generations (due to not only crowding out
of polluting capital but also the direct positive effect of more abatement on environmental quality)
dominate the additional non-environmental costs suffered by these generations (due to the adverse
effects of crowding out on wages).
With a gradual implementation of environmental policy (! «￿), the elderly among those alive at G
t=0 do no longer necessarily benefit. In particular, the temporary increase in capital accumulation on
account of anticipation effects hurts the elderly through two channels, namely a temporarily lower
return on capital and a dirtier environment. The temporary increase in capital accumulation has
consequences also for the generations born immediately after t=0. On the one hand, these generations
have more capital to work with and thus benefit from higher wages. On the other hand, they live in a
dirtier world. Which factor dominates depends on the environmental weight in utility.
3.6. Numerical illustration
This sub-section presents numerical simulations for an abrupt increase of public abatement in a
model with plausible parameter values provided at the bottom of Table 3. This table shows how the
minimum level of the environmental utility weight for which higher public abatement is Pareto-welfare-22-
improving depends on the initial abatement share and the birth rate. The initial abatement share
indicates how ambitious environmental policy is in the initial equilibrium while the birth rate reflects
the importance of intergenerational redistribution between disconnected generations. 
The first panel of Table 3 explores the case of a representative, infinitely lived household as a
benchmark. The third and fourth columns contain the impacts on, respectively, non-environmental and
environmental welfare for the different values of the initial production share of abatement included in
the first column. The second column employs the results from the third and fourth columns to compute
the environmental welfare weight ￿ =-dU (0)/dU (0) for which the gain in environmental welfare EN E E
P
exactly offsets the loss in non-environmental welfare so that overall welfare is unaffected by the
marginal increase in public abatement. For this environmental utility weight, the abatement share
recorded in the first column is optimal. It can be interpreted as the optimal abatement share from a pure
efficiency perspective; a zero birth rate implies that generations are connected so that intergenerational
redistribution is absent.
The second and third panels of Table 3 involve overlapping, disconnected generations. Each
generation experiences distinct welfare effects. Accordingly, the environmental utility weight that
makes households indifferent about a marginal increase in public abatement is specific to each
generation. The environmental welfare weights contained in the fifth column (for a birth rate of 0.02)
and the eighth column (for a birth rate of 0.06) are the minimum welfare weights ensuring that no
generation loses from more public abatement. These weights, which assess the scope for Pareto-
improving reforms, require the computation of the environmental welfare weight that makes the worst-
off generation indifferent about higher abatement. As already noted in sub-section 3.5, this ‘critical’
generation is the oldest of the future generations, i.e. the generation that is born at the time of the abrupt
increase in public abatement. This generation benefits least from the improvement in environmental
quality because the environment improves only gradually due to the stock-flow dynamics. Of all future
generations, this particular generation experiences also the smallest loss in non-environmental welfare
because its wages are hurt least by capital decumulation. However, the crowding-out effects on capital
accumulation are quite small (see sub-section 3.5). Hence, the younger generations are better off in
terms of overall welfare than the older future generations are; whereas they do not suffer much more in
terms of non-environmental welfare than older generations, they benefit substantially more from a
cleaner environment. Figure 3 does indeed show that the date of birth of a future generation exerts a
much larger impact on environmental welfare than on non-environmental welfare, which is rather flat to
the right of v=0. Figure 4 reveals how the date of birth of a generation affects the generation-specific
minimum environmental welfare weights. 
The comparison of the panels indicate that intergenerational disconnectedness complicates-23-
environmental policy. In particular, for each initial abatement share, the minimum environmental utility
weight that ensures that everybody gains is smallest in the absence of disconnected generations (i.e.
￿=0). However, an increase in the birth rate (compare the second and third panels) exerts only
relatively small effects on the minimum environmental utility weight. The reason is that the distribution
of the gain in environmental welfare is quite similar to the distribution of the loss in non-environmental
welfare. In particular, whereas the youngest generations among the future generations benefit the most
from improved environmental quality, they lose most on account of the higher lump-sum taxes. Hence,
the higher lump-sum taxes act like benefit taxes. A higher birth rate implies more substantial crowding-
out effects on private capital accumulation. The environmental benefits in terms of a smaller polluting
capital stock and non-environmental costs in terms of lower wages occur at the same time. Accordingly,
the same generations experience both the benefits and the costs.
Table 4 shows how generations alive at the time of the abrupt increase in public abatement
would vote in case higher abatement would be put to a vote. )(%) denotes the proportion of the
population who gain in overall welfare and who would thus vote in favour of more public abatement.
With high birth rates, the interests of the electorate are more diverse. Accordingly, the electorate tends
to be more divided than with low birth rates. In the latter case, the voters are more homogeneous in
favouring or rejecting higher public abatement.
Table 4 contains also a number of welfare indicators. These indicators confirm the analytical
results in general and Propositions 3.2 and 3.3 in particular. Moreover, the numerical results indicate
that non-environmental welfare for future generations does not fall much with date of birth (i.e.
dU (￿,￿) is not much less than dU (0,0)). Accordingly, the generation born at the time of the policy NE NE
shock is indeed the critical generation in determining the minimal environmental utility weight for which
no generation suffers a loss in overall welfare (see also Figure 4).
4. Intergenerational redistribution policy
This section explores the role of public debt in eliminating the intergenerational inequities resulting
from an abrupt increase in public abatement (i.e. ! ￿￿). The first sub-section employs public debt to G
ensure that all current generations (i.e. generations alive at the time of the policy shock) are equally
well off. The second sub-section adopts a more complex debt policy so that all (i.e. not only current but
also future) generations experience the same change in overall welfare.
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Section 3 showed that the various current generations are affected quite differently by an
abrupt increase in public abatement. Whereas all current generations enjoy the same improvement in
environmental welfare (see Proposition 3.4), these generations experience rather diverging impacts on
non-environmental welfare. In particular, the higher lump-sum taxes hit the younger generations, who
rely heavily on human wealth, harder than the older generations who have accumulated more financial
capital. Accordingly, in contrast to the elderly, the young lose in terms of non-environmental welfare
(see Proposition 3.3).
To offset the intergenerational distributional effects in favour of the older, current generations,
the government needs to levy age-specific taxes. A once-off wealth tax (- ) levied at the time of the K
unexpected policy shock on the stock of financial wealth acts like such an age-specific tax. The
incidence of this tax features the required relationship with age because holdings of financial wealth
rise with age in the initial steady state. Bovenberg and Heijdra (1998) show that the following once-off
capital levy ensures that all generations alive at the time of the policy shock suffer the same decline in
non-environmental welfare:
where B ˜(0)￿rdB(0)/Y stands for the discrete drop in public debt at time t=0 resulting from the revenue
raised by the once-off capital levy. 
The capital levy neutralizes the intergenerational distributional effects on non-environmental
welfare not only for current generations but also for future generations if government debt remains
constant after the initial drop (B ˜(t)=B ˜(0) for all t￿0). In that case, the interest income on the additional
public assets reduces the required increase in lump-sum taxes. The capital levy combined with the
lower additional taxes on human capital ensures that the additional tax burden due to higher public
spending is proportional to consumption rather than human capital. Accordingly, the additional tax
burden is distributed equally over all generations so that all generations experience the same drop in
non-environmental utility: 
for v￿0 and t￿0.
With all generations suffering the same decline in non-environmental welfare, capital
accumulation is no longer crowded out on account of intergenerational distributional effects in favour
























intergenerational distributional effects in terms of non-environmental welfare, aggregate consumption is
no longer redistributed from the future to the present. In terms of Figure 2, the capital levy shifts the
MKR curve down such that this curve intersects the new IS curve directly below E  in point D. 0
Crowding out of household consumption is one-for-one for each unit of additional public abatement.
Since private capital accumulation is thus unaffected, all transitional dynamics disappears from the
non-environmental system, i.e. K ˜(t)=Y ˜(t)=r ˜(t)=W ˜ (t)=0 and C ˜(t)=-G ˜/7  for all t￿0.  C
Without changes in the polluting capital stock, environmental quality is affected only by
additional public abatement. Accordingly, the environment improves gradually according to
E ˜(t)=￿ G ˜A(￿ ,t) on account of stock-flow dynamics between the flow of abatement and the stock of GE
environmental capital. As a result of this gradual improvement in environmental quality, younger
generations enjoy the largest gain in environmental welfare: 
for t￿0. 
With all generations suffering the same drop in non-environmental welfare but current
generations enjoying the smallest boost in environmental welfare, these generations are the `critical'
generations in determining the scope for a Pareto-improving policy. The overall welfare gain to current
generations amounts to:
The abatement share 7  (￿1-7 ) ensuring dU(v,0)=0 is the largest abatement share so that all present GC
generations are at least equally well off (and which thus, in view of (4.2), makes all future generations
strictly better off):
This expression for the Pareto-improving abatement share is similar to the one determining the optimal
abatement share in the representative-agent case (viz. equation (3.12)).  The only difference between
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(3.12) and (4.3) is that (4.3) features a higher “effective” discount rate, ’+￿, in order to account for





















which indicates that generations are more disconnected, produces a lower Pareto-improving share of
public abatement, i.e. 07 /0￿<0. Intuitively, the shorter horizons implied by the larger birth rate imply G
PI
that current generations benefit less from the environmental improvements that materialize only in the
future. 
4.2. Egalitarian policy
If the abatement share is set equal to the abatement share derived in (4.3), all current
generations are indifferent. All future generations, in contrast, are strictly better off due to larger gains
in environmental welfare. This suggests that a more ambitious Pareto-improving environmental policy
is feasible if the government redistributes resources away from future generations to current
generations. Accordingly, the generations that benefit the most from the environmental improvements
compensate the generations that benefit the least from higher environmental quality. Public debt policy
can be employed to ensure that the additional taxes required to finance the additional public abatement
are borne by those who benefit from the environmental gains produced by the additional abatement. In
this way, the additional taxes are in fact benefit taxes since these taxes correspond to the benefits from
the spending that these taxes allow. Public debt thus separates equity concerns from efficiency
considerations, thereby ensuring that all generations benefit from an efficiency enhancing reform.
 In computing the benefit taxes, we impose the requirement that all generations benefit equally
from the environmental policy, i.e. dU(v,0)=dU(t,t)=% for all v￿0 and t￿0. By thus spreading the gains
equally over all generations, we can interpret % as the pure efficiency gain associated with
environmental policy.   To find the intergenerational transfers that yield such a so-called egalitarian
16
policy, we parameterize the time path of public debt as follows:
with  ! >0 and b>0 both finite, so that the bond path is stable and converges in the long run to ii
B ˜ ( ￿ ) ￿ B ˜ (0)+b +b . When raising public abatement, the government thus has five instruments, B ˜(0), b 12 i
and ! (i=1,2), at its disposal to redistribute resources between generations. Bovenberg and Heijdra i
(1998) show that these instruments are sufficient to arrive at an egalitarian policy.
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 As in the previous sub-section, the government levies a one-time tax on the existing stock of
financial wealth at time t=0 in order to equalize welfare for all existing generations:˜ C(￿) ￿￿
˜ G
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By imposing a smaller capital levy than in section 4.1 (see equation (4.1)), the loss in non-
environmental welfare suffered by current generations is smaller. In terms of Figure 2, the downward
shift of the MKR curve is smaller, and also the drop in consumption on impact is less pronounced. As a
direct consequence, investment falls at impact and both consumption and capital are crowded out in the
long run:
The redistribution of non-environmental resources away from future towards current
generations is thus associated with crowding out of man-made capital. In this way, natural capital
replaces man-made capital. Whereas future generations benefit from additional amenities associated
with a larger stock of natural capital, they lose on account of lower before-tax wages due to a smaller
stock of man-made capital.  
  Table 4 reports estimates of the efficiency gains for different values of the birth rate, ￿, and the
initial abatement share, 7  (see the entries for %). If the initial abatement share is zero, the efficiency G
gains are positive for all birth rates considered. Debt policy thus allows the welfare gains to be
redistributed from future towards current generations (of whom many would lose without debt policy
even for modest values of ￿). At the relatively high birth rate of 0.1, political support would be
inadequate without debt policy as a majority of the current generations would vote against higher public
abatement. With debt policy, in contrast, all generations are strictly better off so that political support
is unanimous. 
The bottom of Table 4 presents various abatement shares for each birth rate. 7 ˆ  represents the G
maximum abatement share at which all generations are just indifferent about a marginal increase in
abatement if debt policy ensures that all generations experience the same change in overall welfare (as
explained in this sub-section). The results reveal that, at high birth rates, this abatement share
substantially exceeds the corresponding maximum abatement share (computed in (4.3)) if public debt
ensures only that all current generations are indifferent (see sub-section 4.1), i.e. 7 ˆ> 7. At these high GG
PI
birth rates, this share is also substantially larger than the abatement share for which exactly half of the
current generations is indifferent in the absence of any public debt policy. i.e. 7 ˆ> 7 . This suggests GG
MR
that public debt plays an important role in facilitating the political support for environmental policy if-28-
high birth rates indicate that various generations are rather disconnected.
5. Conclusions
This paper has employed an overlapping-generations model to explore two objections that are often
raised against more public spending on the natural environment, namely crowding-out of physical
capital and intergenerational redistribution at the expense of current generations. The analysis shows
that these objections are not very strong. In particular, the crowding-out effects are only small for
realistic values of the birth rate. Moreover, the crowding-out effects help to limit the intergenerational
redistributional effects by ensuring that younger, future generations, who benefit most from the
environmental improvements, bear more of the costs of financing the higher public abatement. Indeed, a
higher birth rate, which reflects more disconnectedness among generations, implies more crowding out
of private investment in response to higher public abatement. The costs of capital decumulation in
terms of lower wages are borne by the same generations who benefit from a cleaner environment
produced by the lower stock of polluting capital. A lower capital stock thus yields both non-
environmental costs in terms of lower wages and environmental benefits in terms of a cleaner
environment. These costs and benefits accrue at the same time and thus affect the same generations.
The intergenerational redistributional effects of higher public abatement are limited also because the
lump-sum taxes used to finance the higher public abatement act like benefit taxes: the youngest
generations benefit the most from improved environmental quality but also lose the most on account of
the higher lump-sum taxes.
The objections based on intergenerational redistribution can be eliminated completely through
the judicious use of public debt. In particular, by taxing away the windfall gains to future generations
and redistributing them to current generations, the net benefits from a tighter environmental policy are
distributed more equally among the various generations. The associated crowding out of physical
capital is offset by crowding in of natural capital. In effect, society substitutes natural for man-made
capital.-29-
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Figure 1. Equilibrium and stability. 






















Figure 2. Macroeconomic effects of public abatement.
 
Key: Public abatement shifts the IS curve from IS  to IS  and the steady state moves from E  to E . If 01 0 1
the policy is introduced abruptly, the transition path consists of a discrete adjustment from E  to A at 0
the time of the shock, followed by gradual adjustment along the saddle path SP from A to E . With a 1
gradual introduction (! ￿￿), the adjustment path involves a discrete jump from E  to B at the time of G 0
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Figure 3.a. The effect of the speed of introduction on the welfare paths
Private welfare: dU   NE
Environmental welfare: dUE
Key: The parameters are: !  = variable, ￿=0.02,  7  =0, ￿  =0.8, ’=0.04, ￿  =0.1, ￿  =0.1, ￿  =0.5. v GG L E K G
represents the generations index for current generations, and t is the index for historical time, which
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Figure 3.b. The effect of the initial share of abatement on the welfare paths
Private welfare: dU   NE
Environmental welfare: dUE
Key: The parameters are: 7 = variable, ￿=0.02, ! =10 , ￿ =0.8, ’=0.04, ￿ =0.1, ￿  =0.1, ￿ =0.5. v GG L E K G
6
represents the generations index for current generations, and t is the index for historical time, which
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Figure 3.c. The effect of the birth rate on the welfare paths
Private welfare: dU   NE
Environmental welfare: dUE
Key: The parameters are: ￿= variable, 7 =0, ! =10 , ￿ =0.8, ’=0.04, ￿ =0.1, ￿  =0.1, ￿ =0.5. v GG L E K G
6
represents the generations index for current generations, and t is the index for historical time, which
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Figure 4.a. Required environmental weights and policy speed
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Figure 4.c. Required environmental weights and birth rate
Key: Environmental weights ￿ (v,v1) are such that each generation is indifferent to a marginal increase E
in public abatement. The common parameters in panels (a)-(c) are: ￿  =0.8, ’=0.04, ￿ =0.1, ￿ =0.1, LE K
￿ =0.5. In panel (a), ! =variable, ￿=0.02,  7 =0; in panel (b), 7 =variable, ￿=0.02, ! =10 ; in panel GG G GG
6
(c), ￿=variable, 7 =0,  ! =10 ; GG
6￿ C(t) ￿ r(t)￿’ C(t) ￿ ￿(’￿￿) K(t)￿B(t)
￿ K(t) ￿ Y(t) ￿ C(t) ￿ G(t)
￿ B(t) ￿ r(t)B(t) ￿ G(t) ￿ T(t)














Table 1: The model in levels˜ C
.





˜ Y(t)￿7C ˜ C(t)￿ ˜ G(t)





(t) ￿￿˜ E ( t )￿￿ K˜ K ( t )￿￿ G˜ G ( t )
˜ Y ( t )￿(1￿￿L) ˜ K(t)
˜ W(t) ￿ ˜ Y(t)








Table 2: The log-linearised model
†
Shares and elasticities:
￿ WL/Y=W/Y Share of labour income in net output (0<￿ <1). L L
7 C/Y Share of private consumption in net output (0<7 <1). C C
￿ -f Speed of regeneration of the environment (￿ >0). EE E
￿ fK / fE Elasticity of steady-state environmental quality with respect to the steady-state KK E
capital stock (￿ >0). K
￿ -fY / fE   Elasticity of steady-state environmental quality with respect to steady-state GG E
public abatement (￿ >0). G
†) Initial debt is assumed to be zero (B=0).